via Public Reason

A new paper from Christopher Freiman and Shaun Nichols at the University of Arizona sheds some empirical light on how humans view issues of moral desert.

The upshot is this: if you ask people to consider moral desert in terms of an abstract question they side with John Rawls.  If you ask them about a specific example of moral desert, they side with Hume.

As I understand it, here’s what this paper does:

• It provides an empirical account of why philosophers view of moral desert differs from lay persons (namely, that most philosophers disregard it as it has sources in arbitrary value)

Here is what it does not do:

• It does not choose sides on which is the better outlook.

If I had to respond to the research, my first inclination would be to say that there is nothing earth-changing about its inclinations for Rawlsians.  Individuals, as individual actors in a society as a fair system of cooperation may develop and act on mores that views desert in the Humian/David Miller variety.

Rawls’ politically liberal society, as an administrative state, still benefits from the abstract view of moral desert that declines to recognize that we inherently deserve what flows from our talents.  This abstract view that Rawls takes is significant because we are politically entitled to what we do with our talents, because the cultivation of our talents is good for a fair society of cooperation.  The PL abstract view legitimizes inequality in the distribution of wealth based upon what each of us produces, but also justifies taxation of those who earn.  As a social strategy, it reduces class envy on both ends, encourages the development of wealth, and it allows for citizens to behave as citizens and administrators to behave as administrators when it comes to regulating moral desert.